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became the sport of cmnpetitin• hoostt>rism~~md nwjor-leagne bast"'ntll was one of the most covett.
•d trophies to he wm1. 1 Cities themselves played a cutthroat game in which c-ompetition for baseball franchises might hf' considered tlw ultimate World S(•1ies. That game was contpetitive boosterism: the actin"' participa tion of local elitf:'S in luring tradP, industry· aud inveshnent to tht'ir own cities from elsewhere, in a zero-sum Darwinian contl'St. Cities of the:> "lc•an-and-mcc_m" 1990s coped with fl.scal austC'1ity and slow growth by seeking regional n-·distrilmtion of jobs and capitaL offl'r ing to private inn•stors hl\ b1T•aks, rP\"t'llllf' bonds, speculatin_, build ings, research parks, rede\·dopnwnt aiel, and other inducements. On the payrolls of statf's and eitiPs across :"Jmth America were spf'cial ists in ''pconomic developmeut"-players in the game of competitive hoosterism, the "last t>ntrepreneurs" fighting a "ne\\' civil \var." 1 Competition for f"Cnnomk dt:>n:lopment is systemk to tlw polit ical economy of U.S. dtiPs. Likewise, hoostPrism, or ·'the promotion of t>conomic enterprise by organized public and private groups within urban communities,'' as the historian Charles Glaab defined it, runs clccp in the American grain. James Fenimort> Cooper. l\.'lark Twain, and Sinclair Le\\is created booster archet}1Jes in their novels, and dozens of historians have chronicled the activities of land spec ulators, railroad boomers, and town promoters. ~or has the compet itive side of hoosterism suffered from historical neglect: Daniel Boorstin, Richard Wade, and Paul Wallace Gates deseribed lively nineteenth-century contests among frontier towns for rail depots, posh hotels, county seats, and state capitals. Over thC' last thirty years, howPver, not even a Japanese automobilt> factory could match
Competitire Boosterism: Hotc Milwaukee Lost the Braces I .533 I bt>lieve tlw general puhlic realizes tlw importancl' of lll<~or leaguf' hasehall to their comlmmitiPs. It is elearlv in tlw hest int~rests of those eornmunities to protect thos~· fraJI(:hises.
They are important to economic development as Wt'li as quality of Jifp ... To losP a major league baseball franchise would send an unfOrtunate nwssag:e to business and industry that \\'Olild haw· interest in possible location [in those citif's].
Faced with this kind of threat, elected offleials wt>re highlv wilnera hle to what Forhes called "big-league blackmail," and wl;at Sports Illustrated denounced as the "recurring scam" by which "plutocratic extortioners" who happen to own teams "blackmail communities into meeting tlwir demancls-or else.'':> Cities struggling with "the sports franchise relocation issue" found themselves trapped in an urban arms race which forced them to defend their major-league status with plush stadiums and subsi dies. Economic development specialists doubted the wisdom of investing "tax dollars and emotions" in sports as a development strat egy, especially when compared to alternative investments in infra structure, education. or manufacturing employment. Charles Euchner's indictment of the "cannibalistic struggles f(>r .sports franchises" called for federal intervention, and Kenneth Shropshire suggested that sports-minded cities caught in this "surrogate warfare" should question '"whether the huge expenditurt>s needed to be perceived as 'big-league' are worthwhile." Indeed, economists find little rational basis for th<· half-billion dollars in annual net tax transfers to professional sport entities. Yet baseball bidding wars escalated in the 1990s--€ven though. as eeonomist Benjamin Okner found decades ago, precious public dollars flow into thf" pockets of some of the nation's \Vealthiest private indhiduals. Dean Bahn con finned that sports subsidies constitute highly regressive ineome transfers from poor urban taxpayers to a few millionaire O'\vners and players. How did American cities get mired in this e'l'ensive and unproductive game? 0
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Opt:ning Day of baseball's competitive boosterism sc:>ason came on 21 October 1964-the day the Milwaukee Braves baseball team <UlH01mced their move to Atlanta. Tht> importance of this episode ovPr otlu:•r traumatic sports team mo\'ements was emphasized by the broadcaster Howard Cosell. who testified before Congress that tnmsferring the Braves franchise was tht> first and worst example of what he called "the rape of the cities," or the abuse of monopoly power by b<Lseball owners exempt from antitrust law. Bill Vecck, another noted baseball expert, complained at the time that "the Mil waukee situation has disgusted the t>ntire nation." Of course. other cities lost baseball teams before Milwaukee; but forsaken flms of the Boston Braves, the St. Louis Browns, tlw Brooklyn Dodgers, the New York Giants, and tht> Washington Senators could always trans fer their allegiance to another major-leagm-· team in tmvn. That may have been paltry consolation, but l\·filwaukee f~lns \Vere left with no major-league team in any sport. For the first time in modem history, a eity was stripped altogether of its major-league status.
I
The Boston Brave.s were a charter member of hasehall's I'\ational League. organized in 1876, but the franchise enjoyed only sporadic success. Attendance topped one million only three times in Boston, and in ]9,52 it fell to 282,000. 0\\oler Lou Perini, a millionaire con struction tycoon, took pridf' in his "sound busint>ss approach'' to bast>ball. "Lou did not becom<> a successful contractor by letting tht> grass grow under his feet," admired John Gil!oly '!/ and Profes . ., ·imw! Sporls (Washington. D.C., 191; 4 in 19.50--.52, and even Bostonians admitted that the "tlw worst fran chise in the history of baseball" des,rvcd a better fate. "One of these days the Braves may go on the road," warned a local repor!Pr, "and never come back" But no team had moved in half a century, so lea"ing Boston would take an auJacious act.l'l As owner of tlw minor-league Milwaukee franchise, Perini had the exdusi,·e territorial rights to that city under b,tseball's monopo listic operating agreement. Miller. 9 Milwaukee boosters demanded that Perini let their city join the major leagues, lla}ing him in the press for blocking their aspirations. "You don't know all the letters, telegrams, and telephonP calls I've been getting on this thing," Perini complained to fellow 0\\1l<'rs. After negotiating with Miller personally, Perini finally decided to head off other teams and move his own Boston Brav<:>s into Mihvau kec"s new stadium. Business \Veek called it "a dPsperation move" by a "floundering" franchise, but the Milwaukee Joumal praised the ..citizen initiative" of city boosters \vho '"went out and got a big league team" for their city. The Association of Comtnt>rce gavt:> "th(' greatest credit" to Frederick 'vtiller and his businessmen-boostPrs.
~Harold Kaese and H. G. L\1tcb. Tlw .\liltntukei' Rrm:i'S (1'\t'w Hilf!Hi('(f/ Society of Wi.>wn•·in) "\ly ambition is to make Milwaukee a sports center," vowed Miller, ''and keep it that way ... Handall predicted that the Braves would be "the greatest psychological lilt Milwaukee ewr had," prming "that the cmnmunity can he as great as its citizens want it to he."W Spmtswriters marveled at the "adulation and acclaim" heaped on tlw Braves from the momeut they reached !vtilwaukt>e. The strang_prs from Boston wPre greeted by 12.000 ecstatic fans at the tmin station, and 60,000 more cheered during a \Velcome parade through downtown. "I don't think any city has ever gone a.s crazy over a baseball team," recalled third baS<•man Eddie Mathews, and teammate Warren Spahn agreed that the Braves attracted "the big gest and most worshipful follo"ing in the majors." Perini's gam hlP Company. and Chicago's Palmer House. Bill Ve~:ck, who at various times owned several teams himself, scoffed that "'the sum of their total knowl<'dge of baseball is zero." lie predicted that thcs<' opulent sportsmen would never be welcome in fvfihvaukee, which already smarted from Chicago's regional dominance. "To the folks of
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Milwaukee," sympathized \'eeck, "the whole deal had the uncom fmtable smell of city slickers coming in to take over.""' The Rowr Boys quickly ran afoul of local skepticism. Before the start of the 1963 season. the n£'wcomers offered 11.5,000 shares of Braves stock for sale to Wisconsin residents. They hoped to promo!£' f:m interest and allay fears of absentep ownership. while retaining a majority interest for tht:>mse1ve·s. fpw \Visconsin investors doubted that the real intent of the stock ofll>ring was to pay debts incurred in hu)ing th£' team; the prospectus <•v£'n admitted that the offering was for "liquidation of interim financing." Not suqJrisingly, only 11% of the shares were sold. Few local investors cared to help young, inex peiicnccd, out-of-town financiers dis('harge their pf>rsonal debts. Bnt thereafter the owners could daim that Milwaukef' no longer wanted the Braves. Bartholmnav later informed his Board of Directors that because of the faile-d offe1in~, "tllf're is now no obligation whatever on the part of investors to sell to local residents," and thev were free to seek a more hospitable vc>nue.u' \Vhat must have prodded the Rover Boys to seek grePner pas tures was the $.3 million short-term loan they obtained to huy the Bmves in 1962. Interest expense was considerable, with a S2 mi1lion hallrxm payment due in 196H. Rather than spend more money to re\i\'e attendance, the Rover Boys sought a quick flx. By the start of the 1964 season, Bartholomay and his pa•tnprs had committed the Brave., to play in Atlanta in 196.5. Naturally, the Rover Boys hoped to conceal their intentions and avoid a "lamt• dm:k" season in \vhich heartbroken fans would shun a fleeing team. "The Braves \\ill he in Mihvaukee today. tomorrow, next year and as long as we are welcome," team president ~~lcHale told tlw media \vhen ntmors of a move first appeared. "\\'e art' positively not moving," asserted Bar tholomay just days after secretly flnalizing the deal with Atlanta. "We're phi)ing in Milwaukee, whether you're talking 1964, 196.5 
Times, :3 July I 004. 1.5.
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Bartholomay made the official announcement (from Chicago) that the Braves would move to Atlanta in 196.5, pending league approval.
Milwaukee boosters nmv lashed the mvners as much for their deceit as for their desertion. "If they had gone about it above board, Mil waukee would have been sore, hut that's all," complained a local businessman. Speaking for many piqued fims was a third-grader who sent Bartholomay a crayoned note: "YOU ARE A LIAH." More to the point, Milwaukee County attorney George Rice informed the press: "\Ve are prepared to file legal al'tion any time, any day v.·ithin an hour." The county board anthorized counsel to incur any e:x1Jensc nt->ce-ssary to keep the Bran•s in tm-vn. 1 fi Milwaukee still had a tmmp card to play. Bartholomay knew that the Braves' stadium lease ran through 196.5, but apparently he assumed that the county would accept a cash sf'ttlenwnt. The team paid about $200,000 in rent in 1964, and Bartholomay alTered to buy out the contract's final year for $.500,000. But the county board voted 24--{} to reject this offer-in effect. forfeiting ta,payers' money by forcing the Braves to stay after they had already announced their departure. Angered fans would surely disdain a team destined for some other city, and since rent was ba...,ed on ticket and concession sales, poor attendance would mean lost revenue for the county as well as for the team. Indeed, fan boycotts in 196.5 pared attendance down to an all-time low of .55.5,,584, barely one-third of the team's 12-year average in Milwaukee. "Why should I give my money to some other city?" groust-d a typical ex-fan that year. Stadium income did not even begin to cover costs-only Rl2 tickets wer<' sold for one game-and the Rover Boys lost nearly $1 million playing out a sea son that no one wanted. Sports Illustrated sympathized that the Braves had hPcome "enemies in the city that once loved them," hut Arthur Dalev of the Nerc York Times rightlv blamed the owners, who had "bungled the operation" in their "gre~dy haste" to leave tmm. 19 McHale expressed astonishment that "Milwaukee does not, after III \\'h,· did Bartholomay and his associates claim they had to lt•an• Mil waukee~ "The sharp decline in the citv\ inkrest in baseball is obvious." the owners asst'rted. pointing to flagginp; attt'mlance. Tlwy told the Wall Street Journal that they lost 83..5 million in Milwaukee, though at the trial they claimed more modest losses of $.50,000 to $2.50,000 a vear. They blamed the "anti-baseball dim<tte" of local press and politicians fi>r dri\ing them away. 1\kHale complained that "the team and ownership wert' eontinually heing knocked down. besmirched and \iii fled." He ass<•Jted that "taking a crack at the Braves lwcame a political pastime in Mih\·ankPe, which. tog:etht·-r with the unfriendly press. set the stagt• f(>r killing baseball'. in that city. Bartholomay agreed that \'lilwaukee·s "antagonistic attitude" made for a n1ost "unwelcmn{:'·· atmosplwn-'. Baseball attorneys intro duced in evidt>nce a thick sheaf of columns and speedws as proof of local antipathy. At $.535.000 a year f(Jr three years, above league average. "\oVe feel it's \ita! that the Braves continue in Milwaukee," declared Schlitz chair man Robert Uihlein, Jr. No act of corporate boosterism, however, could compete with Atlanta's broadcast appeal. Milwaukee's adver tising market of 2.5 million TV households halted at Chicago to the south, Minneapolis to the west, Canada to the north, and Lake Michigan to the ea>t. Around Atlanta sprawled a seven-state empire of six million baseball-deprived households between the Atlantic Ocean and the Mississippi River. The nearest rival franchises were in Baltimore, Cincinnati, and Houston. Baseball had long ignored the southeast. Milwaukee paid the price of that neglect, and the Rover Boys simply cashed in on it. The Braves received 82.5 million for their first broadcast contract in Atlanta. Milwaukee ofHcials sur mised that this was "the main reason, if not the only reason" f(Jr the move. "Tele,ision money is clearly at the bottom of eveiJ1hing," groused Kuechle, concluding that his city had been "Immolated on the Altar of the Antenna." Indeed, sports historians often cite the Braves' relocation as "a classic example of the attraction of television revenue. " 27 IV If the Rover Boys felt compelled to disparage Milwaukee's "baseball climate," Milwaukee boosters also felt compelled to refute their insults. A local reporter feared that if the Braves left town, the rest of the country might well conclude' "All those krauts want to do is sit around and drink be,•r." Bartholomay had already eominced other owners that Milwaukee was no longer a viable venue. One owner testified that whereas Chicago was a "wonderful baseball tmm," Milwaukee was "not a good baseball town." In fact, the Mil for Opening Day and resold tickets so that fans could attPnd '>'ithout paying the hated Rover Boys. Proceeds went to a booste>r fimd to keep Milwaukee in the major leagues. '"Stand Up for MilwaukPe Day" was the best-attended game of the entire lame-duck season. It so embarrassed the Rover Boys that they did not allow TPams, Inc. to buy out any more games. Selig appeared before other 0'>'11Prs to reassure them that Milwaukee was still "a Major League City in all respects,"' but he found himself "bucking a previously succpssful sales campaign" in baseball cirdes 29 Milwaukee howled in the team less wildemess for the rest of the 1960s. Wisconsin had proved it could support major-league sports, and the succ::essful Green Bav Packers dominated the National Foot ball League at the time. But baseball owners were immune to Mil waukee's appeals. "We were treated like we had leprosy." Selig recalled. !!is co-investors incorporated as the Milwaukee Brewers observed the \Vall Street Joumal, "and so is Atlanta's eagerness to grab them." The enthusiasm of Atlanta's competitive boosters was already legt>ndary at the time. Georgia Governor Ernest Vandiver sounded like a coach at halfiime when lw told a roomful of Atlanta businessnwn in 1961 that "we are in the middle of a spirited bidding for industrial plants." and "we are going to be f(mnd pushing eve"} honorable and efff_>etive te('hnique" to attract business. However honorable, Atlanta's tedmi<tues did prove quite effective. "There is no adequate word to describe Atlanta's physical and economic growth during the sixties," crowed Mayor Ivan Allen, Jr.. who pre sided over the boom years. Boosterism lifted Atlanta to regional supremacy"' the New South's urban sho\\piece in the 1960s. when magnolia trees along Peachtree Street gave way to gleaming sky scrapers and snarled freeways. Atlanta had been the home of Henry Grady, the original New South booster. Tlw city's ;igorous tradition of competitive hoosterism even had a name: the "Atlanta Spirit."
Scarlett O'Hara had sniffed that Atlanta was full of "mi~hty pushy people." Many historians have con finned her impression of Atlanta's "growth syndrome," "grmvth mania," "all-out drive," and "intense civic patriotism." IndeC'd, the city's "relentless boosteri.sm" eventu ally garnered the 1996 Olympiad.-1 2
Atlantans enshrined boosterism in office in 1861, when they elected millionaire businessman and chambC'r of commerce prPsi dent Ivan Allen, Jr. as their mayor. Allen's "Forward Atlanta" plat form was borrowed from his father, a leading New South booster who had publicized Atlanta's commercial advantages to meet the competition from Florida's land hoom back in 192.3. Mayor Allen Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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flf'ver doubtt'd that "tlw secret to Atlanta's success" was competitivP boosterisrn. lie lauded his fellow businessmen "who were totallv dedicated-albeit, pragmatically, benevolently. and paternalistically -to the welfare of their city." Allen recruikd "a phalanx of businessmen" to sPrve as "'chPPrleaders" for Atlanta. Private boost ers spent Sl.fi million of their own money advertising tlw city in national trade mag:azinPs during Allen's administration. "Greater love hath no man than he gh·e his gold to his community," approved the Atlanta Coustitution-" 1 Urban historian Carl Abbott has likened N cw South businessmen-boosters to Old South plantC'r aristocrats who pre sumed that "their stake in the economv entitled them to control public decisions." More eharitably, All~n·s longtime predecessor William Hartsfield believed that "Atlanta has alwavs been fortunate in having its leading and influential citizens p·~1rticipate in the govr·rnnwnt." Jimmy Carter, as Governor of Georgia, appreciated businessmen who were "willing to take part in politics . . without anv selfish motive." Boosterism is never whollv selfless, but, as l'ityor Allen explained, Atlanta boosters simply b~lieved that "what evpr was good for Atlanta was good for them." Of course, not all Atlantans shared equally in what was "good" for Atlanta-esp<>ciallv not the black half of the population. By decade's end, the Voting Rights Act and racial discontent stirred by urhan renewal would plact-' African-Americans in charge of their city. Acquiring the Braves, according to Atlanta historians Norman Shavin and Bruce Galphin, was "th<> last time such a major decision could be made by the he11evolent oligarchs of the business leadership \\ithout broader community input. ".l.J Major-leagne basf'ball was the booster trophy Mayor Allen The journalist Calvin Trillin has noted "the tendency in sun belt glamor cities to focus civic pride on a single project of pharaonic scale," and Allen envisioned a Cheops of the New South. "Our sta dium is a Southern project, built on Southern soil, by Southern architects and contractors," he proclaimed. Allen often linked Atlan ta's aspirations to regional identity, a booster tactic pioneered by Ht>nry Grady. Atlanta-Fulton County Stadium symbolized more than the :'~lew South's rebirth, however; it also trumpeted the arrival of a Sunhclt metropolis demanding admission to the major-league club.
Local boosters appreciated that Allen's ambitious project "brought In addition to the siren call of broadcasting revenue, a generous stadium contract drew the Braves marching to Georgia. Arthur ~lontgomery, chainnan of Allen's stadium authority, may have enter tained doubts about the low-rent deal, hut at a critical juncture in the negotiations. he received an urgent call. "Forget the pocket change," Allen shouted at him over the phone. "Sign the contract." The terms were less than favorable to Atlanta, granting the Braves generous prerogatives and even requiring the dty to indemni(y the 1\ational League for legal costs in the antitrust suit. This costly com petitive booster 'ictory foreshadowed the sort of profitless stadium deals many cities now act:ept under pain of losing a franchise. Dean Baitn's 1990 study concluded that Atlanta-Fulton County Stadium lost nearly $20 million in its first 25 years, and "it is unlikely this facility will earn a positive return." Considered "the worst playin!( surface in professional sports" by many atheletcs. Allen's prized sta dium was slated for demolition in 1996.:~H \Vhen the Braves finally reached Atlanta in 1966, Mayor Allt>ll declared Opening Day a holiday and 1.50,000 peoplt> thronged Mag nolia Strt>t't for a welcome parade. Ch-il \Var allusions ran rampant. The mayor pointed out that the Braves had announced their move one hundred years after Atlanta was left "an ash-strewn niin," and he predicted that the team's arrival would be "the happiest <>eeasion Winning the Braves also marked a victory for the Sunbelt over tlw Frostbelt. The journalist Kirkpatrick Sale, who drew attention to this inter-regional "power shift," recognized that sport was integral to the "gnmth culture" of the Sunbelt. "During the period that pro fessional sports have changed from a happy pastime to a bountiful business," major-league franchises "moved steadily into the nether reaches of the country." Expansion to the "booming cowboy cities" helped re\italize professional sport while transferring these coveted signifiers of regional success. Urban historian Gene Burd concurred that in the Sunbelt, "the winning team symbolizes the 'big league' status for t>merging cities which use sports imagery as a vehicle for civic rivall)' and in the competition for tourists, new industry, and the piracy of old industry." Given Atlanta's acknowledged status as "archetype of the Sunbelt South," media coverage of the Braves epi sode ht>Iped accentuate "the seeond war between the states" in the l960s. H'iwwu.in. Milrnmkcl'.; Brann of the Association of Commerce in 1964, "no one would \\'ant to expand or locate an industrial facility in this area." He hoped that the Braves' departure would remove ''the last of any complacent attitude," because more was at stake than just baseball. "In fi1ture months and years it may not be Atlanta seeking a baseball team," he prophesied. "It might he some other city seeki1-1g one of our maufac turing facilities." University of \Visconsin e-conomists reported a growing <:onsensus among local businessmen that Milwaukee's "busi ness climate" left much to he desired in the 1960s. Investment dol lars flowed out of state, eroding a once-strong manufacturing base and enriching low-wage, low-tax, low-regulation Southern states such as Georgia. 
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Henrv Maier was elected mavor in 1960. He created the Division of Economic Development to make his eity more competitivP in the booster game. "Every largt> city in the country is crowding us," he admonished, "and the fl!(ht is gt>ttin!( tougher than ever." Ahead of other Milwaukeeart.s, Maier realizt><l that "we had to lind ways and means of attracting and stimulating more private investment." As president of the National LeaguP of Citit>s and the U.S. ConferencP of f\..1ayors, Maier called for "reordering our national priorities," drawing attention to urban blight. In 1964, he wanrt•lL "The hi!(h geared race t(-.r industry compels us to run very, very fast just to keep even-lt>t alone to surge ahead." Maier exhorted Milwaukee boost ers to "go on a \var f(>oting' in the nation-wide hattie f(>r plants," adding: "\\~e must step up our defenst:'s to stop or at least reduee tht> pi1laging of our existing industries." Maier understood tlu~ impor tance of the Braves battle: "The <'yes of the nation "ill he upon Mil waukt:t> to (~xamint> our credentials as a major leagne city not only in the matter of hasehall, hut in all phct-,es of community life."-1:2 During the MilwaukeP Braves' final season, the city council approved an aggressive campaign to "hoost economic development," adopting the slogan: ''Milwaukee, great f(H business, g<t>at for li,ing, and gro'A·ing greater." This message appean'd on lmmperstickers, billboards, and crates of goods headed out of town. A local reporter predicted that future historians would identify 1965 as the year when !vlilwaukee's businessmen, "once reluctant to participate in eity affairs, became more highly organized than ever to push fiJr progrt•ss." Nine davs after the Braves played their llrst game in Atlanta, leading Milwaukee boosters conducted a "Forum for Progress" sponsored by the Mil1caukee Seutiuel. The first panel dis cussion raised the competitive booster alarm: "\Visconsin 's Industrial Future: Does It Have One?" Governor Warren Knowl.o>s used the occasion to tout his '"\Ve Like It Here .. economie development cam paign. It seemed that losing the Braves had finally stirred Milwau keeans out of their complacency:.n ll Hichanl S. Da,is. "~<fi!w,mh·l': Old Lady Thrift.'" in RobertS. Allen. 011r }""air City (New York. IH..tl). Ma.if:'r quot ('(l in Mihumkt"e Se11fi11el, 12 April 196.5. ll Miifnmkec Sentim-f. 8 July. 22 July, 1 S('pt. 196.5; LavvTt'nce C. l.ohlll<U1ll in Mif lulllk~·e Joumaf, 26 July 100.'5; Knowles quoted in 1966' Milu:aukH· Se11tim·l Third Annual 
